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The counting of ballots, especially punchcard ballots, has received a great deal of atten-
tion in the years following the 2000 presidential election in Florida. Much of the research
literature has focused on various measures of how accurately voting machines record voter
intentions, with studies of the relative accuracy rates across voting machines (e.g., Cal-
tech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2001), studies of voting accuracy across groups of the
electorate (Alvarez and Sinclair 2003), and studies that examine the variability in voting
machine accuracy across both machine types and voter types (Alvarez, Sinclair and Wilson
2002; Ansolabehere 2002; Tomz and Van Houweling 2003).
This literature has analyzed voting machine accuracy in the context of the reliability of
vote intention recording, either through the prism of the “residual vote,” or through the
study of over- and undervotes (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2001; Ansolabehere
and Stewart 2004; Hanmer and Traugott 2004; Alvarez, Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005).
Recent research has made much progress studying voting machine accuracy but continually
runs into a simple measurement problem: how can the researcher be certain that observed
residual votes, overvotes, or undervotes result from problems introduced into the balloting
process by the voting machines themselves and not from errors made by the voters? Equally
problematic, how certain can the researcher be that a residual vote, overvote, or undervote
was not the result of a deliberate decision by a voter herself to not cast a vote in some
race (a deliberate undervote) or to intentionally vote for more than the allowed number of
candidates (a deliberate overvote)?1
∗We thank the Los Angeles Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, Conny McCormack for providing us with
the data we use in this paper. We also thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the John S. and
James L. Knight Foundation for supporting our research efforts in this area. Katz would like to thank the
John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation for funding his research. Lexi Shankster provided in-
valuable assistance with this data. Richard Hasen, Stephen Graves, and Charles Stewart provided comments
on earlier versions of this paper.
1For example, in Herron and Sekhon (2003) study of ballot image data from two Florida counties from the
now infamous 2000 presidential election found 412 ballots that included votes for all 10 choices for president.
It is hard to imagine that these were mistakes, but more likely some sort of protest vote.
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Yet another dimension of potential error in vote counting regards tabulation. That is,
voters might mark their intentions on a ballot correctly, but when the ballot is initially
tabulated the device used to count ballots might fail to record the voter’s intention. This
type of tabulation error may be especially prevalent when voters use ballots on which they can
make common errors, like overvotes or undervotes, and thus punchcard or optical scanning
voting systems seem particularly prone to these problems. In these situations the voter may
attempt to indicate a vote intention, only to do so in such a way that the tabulation device
may fail to record the intended vote.
As the public became aware in November 2000, this type of tabulation error can easily
happen in election jurisdictions using pre-scored punchcard voting systems. If for some
reason the so-called “chad” is not cleanly removed from the punchcard, the chad’s presence
can block the vote intention from being recorded when the ballot is machine-tabulated. Or, a
“loose” chad could lead to the recording of an incorrect vote or possibly an overvote. Unless
these ballots are then recounted accurately, it might be difficult for these vote intentions to
be recorded correctly.2
In this paper we study the potential extent of these types of machine tabulation errors
arising from the use of pre-scored punchcard ballots. We take advantage of a unique aspect
of California election law and the good will of the election official in California’s largest
election jurisdiction (Los Angeles County). California election law requires that election
officials recount ballots from 1% of precincts after every election. We have obtained the
results of the mandatory 1% recount from three recent general elections in Los Angeles
County, and we use that data to estimate the rate at which there are tabulation differences
when votes are counted by machine and by hand.
As far as we are aware, there is little literature that uses data like ours to assess the
difference between machine and manual tabulation for punchcard voting systems. There is,
of course, a lively literature on the Florida recount itself (e.g. Dershowitz (2001), Gillman
(2003), and Posner (2001)). And now that the current litigation over the disputed 2004
gubernatorial election in Washington state is concluded, we suspect there will be a literature
that discusses that case. But the only extant research papers that we have found are two
recent papers using recount data from New Hampshire. The first paper is from Ansolabehere
and Reeves (2004), who use data from New Hampshire recounts from the 1946 - 2002 period
to study the accuracy of voting technologies. In their study, Ansolabehere and Reeves
examine complete ballot recounts, done either by hand or more recently by optical scanning
devices, and find that the differences between initial and recount tabulation rates are much
lower if the ballots are counted using an optical scan device than if they were counted twice
by hand. The second paper, by Herron and Wand (2004), focuses on 2004 New Hampshire
recount data from local election jurisdictions and evaluates claims of election irregularities
in areas using optical scan voting devices.
2Problems like these can easily arise when different voting systems are used. Recently, the City of Los
Angeles utilized Los Angeles County’s “InkaVote” voting system (essentially a punchcard-style ballot, but
one that the voter makes a small ink mark on, instead of removing a chad, to indicate vote intention) for
the first round of voting in their 2005 citywide elections. According to media reports from the May 2005
citywide runoff elections, the Los Angeles City Clerk election workers used markers to “re-ink” ballots where
the voter’s mark was thought to be too faint for the machine tabulation to count (Anderson and Orlov 2005).
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Our analysis differs from both the Ansolabehere and Reeves’ study and the Herron and
Wand paper in a number of ways, the most important difference being that we study a
situation where the ballots are first counted by machine and then a subset of all ballots cast
is counted by hand. This critical difference allows us to estimate the extent to which the
initial machine tabulation of the ballots differs from the hand count, which in turn allows us
to gauge the accuracy of the tabulation process.3
In the next section of this paper we discuss the methodology we use, and we then proceed
to discuss the results of our analysis. Based on the results of the 1% manual recounts, we
extrapolate the potential aggregate effect of the difference between machine and manual
counts in selected races. We find generally that the number of votes counted is higher when
the pre-scored punchcard ballots are counted manually rather than by machine tabulation;
however, the increase in the number of votes counted is typically quite small, and given that
there are relatively few close contests in Los Angeles County, we estimate that the machine
undercount will rarely have a substantive impact on election outcomes. We conclude by
discussing the recounting of ballots, the 1% manual recount procedures in use in California,
and the implications of our study for the current debate about the auditing of elections.
1 Manual Recounts in Los Angeles County
The data used in this analysis are the original machine counts of votes and the subsequent
manual recounting of a subset of votes from Los Angeles County for the 2000 presidential
general election, 2002 gubernatorial general election, and 2003 statewide special election.
After each election the county is required to perform a manual recount of ballots in a sample
of 1% of randomly-drawn precincts in the county.4 Procedurally, the chief election official in
the county determines which precincts will be selected for the 1% manual recount, and then
all of the ballots cast from each of the selected precincts are retrieved for the recounting
process.
We had the opportunity to observe the 1% manual recount following the 2003 recall
election in Los Angeles County. During that 1% recount, ballots were manually recounted
3We say “possibly” here because it is certainly true that the manual counting process itself is not error-free
and that hand-counting of paper ballots introduces the possibility of error into the process that might generate
deviations in the number of tabulated votes between a machine and manual count. Having directly witnessed
the manual tabulation of ballots during the 2003 recall election, our intuition is that the methodology used
to manually recount those ballots may be a more accurate baseline than the initial machine tabulation,
and we discuss the precise methodology of the manual recount we witnessed later in this paper. However,
much more research is necessary as to what errors are introduced into ballot tabulation by both people and
machines as we have little research on point at this time.
4The requirement for California counties to perform the 1% manual recount is in Section 15360 of the
state election code, which states “During the official canvass of every election in which a voting system is
used, the official conducting the election shall conduct a public manual tally of the ballots tabulated by
those devices cast in 1 percent of the precincts chosen at random by the election official.” California election
code (Section 15620) allows any citizen of the state to file a request for a complete recount, within a certain
period. The citizen must deposit sufficient funds to cover the costs of the process with the election official
doing the recount, though these funds will be returned to the citizen if the recount reverses the initial results
(an excellent summary of these procedures is available from http://www.lavote.net/voter/recount.htm).
3
for each of the four contests on the ballot (the two recall questions and two ballot measures) in
each of the selected precincts. A team of county employees would be provided one precinct’s
ballots, and this team would then count the total number of ballots. The team would
then examine each punchcard ballot for indications of a voter’s intention for one of the four
contests on the ballot; one individual would call out her assessment of the voter’s intention on
the contest, and a second individual would verify that assessment while the other two team
members would record each assessment of voter intent manually on paper. In cases where
there was disagreement or uncertainty in the assessment, a senior election official would be
asked to adjudicate. When finished, the team would move to another precinct’s ballots for
that same contest until all of the precincts for that contest were recounted.
Our interest is in comparing the initial machine counts of ballots against these manual
recounts. The machine and manual vote counts from the precincts in the 1% manual recount
were aggregated for each state or county level race in the three elections.5 The average
difference between the number of votes in the machine and manual counts in each precinct
was then computed for each of these races (that is, the difference in votes is equal to the
manual count minus the machine count). The average percent difference was calculated by
dividing the difference between the manual and machine counts by the manual count of votes
in each precinct. Based on the data provided to us, we have no way of verifying whether
the same ballots are not recording votes in both the machine and manual recount, though
we suspect that generally this should be the case given the underlying reasons for prescored
punchcard ballots to not record a vote in both tabulation procedures.6 Table 1 shows the
data as well as the calculations for each race.7
[Table 1 Goes Here]
There are a number of interesting points that are made apparent by Table 1. First, the
manual count is almost always greater than the machine count of votes. In fact, we only
find five instances in the 57 candidate races or ballot measures in our data where the total
number of votes counted manually is lower than the total number of votes counted in the
initial machine tabulation. That is, in approximately 92% of the cases we find that the
manual recount reveals more votes cast than were counted in the initial tabulation.
Given the nature of pre-scored punchcards and the differences between the machine and
manual counting procedures, this finding is not that much of a surprise. In all likelihood
some ballots have hanging chads of various sorts — for example, a so-called “swinging” chad.
These hanging chads can block the card opening and the machine tabulator can fail to record
a vote in the race. In such cases, by individually examining the ballot by hand, the hanging
5In this analysis we concentrate only on the candidate races or ballot measures that all voters in the
entire county saw on their ballot. This excludes from our analysis a number of municipal candidate races
and ballot measures.
6Stephen Graves pointed out to us in personal communication (August 5, 2005) that if one assumes
that both tabulation procedures are failing to record vote, we are getting an accurate understanding of
the potential differences between the two tabulation methods. But as Graves pointed out to us, if the two
tabulation methods are actually not recording votes for the identical set of ballots, then there are potentially
different consequences for tabulation differences than we can estimate with the data we have.
7For the 2002 election there were 57 precincts included in the manual recount. In the governor’s race the
recount data were only reported for 54 of these precincts, and for each of the statewide measures the recount
data were reported for 58 precincts.
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chad may be found and the individuals recounting the ballots can attempt to divine the
voter’s actual intention.
Second, we see in Table 1 that the percent difference between the machine and manual
counts is fairly small. The largest average percent difference (in absolute value) in any race
is 0.76% (with a variance of 0.000149), and the overall average percent difference is 0.24%
(with a variance of 0.000170).8 We find that important, top-of-the-ticket races generally have
small differences. For example, in the 2000 presidential race there were a total of 38 more
votes counted in the manual recount than in the original machine tabulation, or a difference
of 0.29%. This is roughly in line with the difference observed in the 2002 governor’s race
where in total 0.20% more votes were counted in the manual recount than in the original
machine recount. Therefore, the initial machine tabulation misses the vote intention only in
a small number of ballots.
Next, we summarize the findings graphically. Figures 1 and 2 are histograms of the
differences between each counting method. The vertical line on each chart is at zero in
order to emphasize that the percent difference is generally positive and, therefore, that the
manual count is typically larger than the machine count. Figure 1 presents a histogram of
the percent difference between the machine and manual counts pooling the data for all three
elections. Figure 2 presents a histogram of the percent differences between the machine and
manual counts for just the 2002 election, isolating this one election as a representative case.
[Figures 1 and 2 go here]
The graphical presentations in these two figures underscore our two basic findings with
these data. The first is that the differences are largely positive — notice in both figures that
much of the mass of the distributions are positive (to the right of zero). Again, the manual
recounting of these punchcard ballots typically produces a higher count of votes. The second
result also clear from the figures is that the deviation between the original machine and later
manual tabulations are typically very small.
The consistent difference between the machine and manual counts of votes naturally
raises the question of whether the difference in the counts might ever be substantial enough
to possibly change the outcome of an election. Obviously only a complete manual recounting
of votes could ever actually show the precise extent of the problem, but our data allow us
to determine the potential effects of the errors in machine tabulation we have documented
in this simple analysis. The key question is how often are races in Los Angeles County ever
close enough (in this set of elections) that we might be concerned that the tabulation errors
found from manual recounting errors might have been of sufficiently great magnitude to sway
the outcome of some elections.
To understand more completely whether the types of differences we see in the data are
consequential, we focus on the five closest races in Los Angeles County in the three elections
for which we have data. These five close races are listed in Table 2. We note that these are
only the results in Los Angeles County, not results for the entire state of California. Recall
that the greatest average deviation that we observed across all of the races in these three
election cycles was 0.76% — so the first counterfactual question we pose here is whether any
8The reported variance is for the actual decimal value of the calculated vote differences rather than the
percentages.
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elections in our sample were decided by less than a percentage of votes cast. The second
counterfactual, then, considers a more reasonable scenario: were any of these close races
decided by what would be a statistician’s “best guess” tabulation difference, 0.24%, the
overall average difference of the recounts for which we have data?
Examination of Table 2 shows that the closest race in our sample was the special election
of 2003 on the question of whether Gray Davis should be recalled as Governor of California.
In Los Angeles County as a whole this race would have been decided by a margin of 2.00%,
much greater than the 0.76% that was found to be the greatest average percent difference
between the machine and manual counts of votes, even assuming the worst case that all
these mis-tabulated votes were for the recall. All of the other races in Los Angeles County
were, of course, decided by even great vote margins, and so the outcomes were unlikely to
have been changed had there been a manual recount of votes for the entire county. Thus, it
is clear that in our sample there never was a race that was even as close as the worst-case
scenario of tabulation deviations, which certainly implies that no race was as close as our
“best guess” tabulation difference.9
Another question that could be asked, however, is how often are there any races in Los
Angeles County that are within this margin of differences between machine and manual
counts of votes, including the vast array of local and municipal races? These are the races
for which there would most likely be differences in the winners of the machine and manual
counts of votes. In order to address this question, all races in Los Angeles County during the
time period of 2000 to 2002 were examined, not only the races that were county or statewide.
These races include party primaries, city positions, school district boards, and all manner of
local elections.
During this time period, there were a total 919 races in Los Angeles County. We could
identify clear winners in 848 of these races.10 In this set of election, 648 races were actually
contested. The average wining vote margin across these contested races was 20.63%.11 Look-
9Stephen Graves (personal communication, April 7, 2001) noted that an approximation for how spoiled
or fraudulent ballots could influence close election outcomes Graves noted that one way to approximate the
probability that a candidate wins an election, given a certain margin of votes by which they lost (M) and
the number of spoiled ballots (N) is:
P = 1− Φ(M/
√
N) (1)
assuming that spoiled ballots are distributed equally between the two candidates. As applied to our example,
consider the 2003 recall vote, where a margin of 40,119 votes separated yes on the recall (984,222 yes votes
in Los Angeles County) and no votes (1,024,341 no votes). Using the maximum difference estimate of 0.76%
and the number of votes initially tabulated by machine in this race (13,362), we estimate that as many as
a 102 vote difference might have arisen in this situation under the worst-case scenario. Substituting 102 for
N and 40,119 for M in the Graves approximation, we find that the probability that the “loser” might have
actually won is zero. It is only when we literally change the margin of victory to handfuls of votes that we
see any positive probability that the “loser” might have actually won; for example, had the margin of victory
only been 10 votes in Los Angeles County for this race with the maximum tabulation difference there would
have been a .16 probability of “loser” potentially winning.
10A winner could not be determined, for example, in elections for delegates to national party conventions.
11The calculations for computing the margins vary depending on the characteristics of the particular race.
For example, for a board of directors in which three people are elected, the vote difference between the
6
ing at these contested races, 57 were decided by a margin of 0.76% or less of the votes cast in
that race. Thus, of the races for which winners could be determined, 6.72% were decided by a
margin of 0.76% or less. That is, slightly less than 7% of the races in Los Angeles county in a
three year period had vote margins within the range where the difference between a machine
a manual count of votes could potentially alter the outcome of the election. Additionally, of
those races for which winners could be determined, 15, or 1.77%, were decided within the
margin of the observed average percent difference between the original and manual recount
of 0.24%.
Figure 3 presents a histogram of the vote margins for the 648 contested races. As shown
in the histogram, the vote margins drop off quickly after four percent. Thus many of the
local races in Los Angeles County are being decided by a fairly small margin of votes. It is
worth noting that many of these close races are contests in which multiple candidates are
elected. For example, in a race in which seven people are elected, it is the difference between
the seventh and eighth most popular candidates that decides the final election outcome. In
such a race the vote margin would be expected to be quite close, and the outcome of a
machine count could fairly easily be different from the outcome determined by a manual
count.
Does this analysis suggest that all pre-scored punchcard ballots should be manually
counted in all situations? Or is the 1% manual recount procedure sufficient to document
substantial problems, situations so outrageous that a full recount should be required? This
of course can be considered a simple question of statistical power where we can draw upon
what we know from the large literature on sampling to determine if a procedure like the 1%
manual recount is sufficient to document substantial problems. However, for us to be able
to apply sampling theory to this question we need to make one important assumption (that
we are sampling precincts to be recounted randomly) and to know at least two important
parameters (how certain we want our test to be and how large the potential differences are
likely to be). The latter two parameters are simple ones that can be determined by election
officials or policymakers. The assumption is also a simple one, but it cannot be overlooked
in the use of this data to make substantive conclusions or methodological recommendations.
Thus, we undertook an analysis to see if the precincts used in these three 1% manual
recounts are indeed being drawn randomly from the larger population of precincts in each
election. Unfortunately, our analysis leads us to believe that these precincts are not a random
draw from a larger population. We found that there appears to be a selection bias in the
precincts that are included in the 1% manual recount. There were ten races in the analysis
for which it was possible to determine the party affiliation of the candidates, and a paired t
test indicates that the top Democratic candidates in these races received a significantly lower
aggregate vote share in the precincts included in the recount than in Los Angeles County as
a whole. This result is consistent across all three elections. This bias simply indicates that
the precincts included in the recount are not (statistically) representative of Los Angeles
County, most likely because the precincts are not chosen completely at random. Because
candidate receiving the third most votes and the candidate receiving the fourth most votes was used to
calculate the vote margin. Also, on bond issues in which 2/3 of the voters must pass the bond, the difference
between the percent of votes cast ”yes” and 2/3 was used as the vote margin.
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this analysis looks at the absolute change in the vote count for each race independent of vote
shares for individual candidates, it is not clear that this bias will have an appreciable impact
on the findings in this paper, but it does prevent our ability to make strong methodological
recommendations based on this particular dataset.
2 Conclusions
It is now widely known by researchers and the public that pre-scored punchcards can yield
significant errors; the precise extent to which these errors are due to voter error or due to
machine error has been a question that has eluded previous researchers. In our analysis, we
have taken advantage of a unique dataset and have shown that election jurisdictions using
pre-scored punchcard voting systems might be systematically undercounting vote intentions.
The problem posed by undetached paper chads could lead to incorrect election results.
However, our analysis has also shown that in this set of elections the machine under-
counting of ballots is relatively slight and that it does not appear to systematically impact
any particular candidates or choices on ballot measures. This does alleviate some concern
about the machine under counting of pre-scored punchcard votes, but in situations where
races are extremely close there might be reason for concern.
We must point out, though, that we are not arguing that all ballots should always be
tabulated by hand, nor that hand-tabulated ballots are necessarily counted more accurately
than those tabulated by machine. First, our results are limited to the specific case of pre-
scored punchcard ballots, and we do not know if our results would generalize to any other
cases (like optical scanning ballots); studies similar to ours should be conducted on the dis-
crepancies between initial tabulation and recounting of ballots from other voting systems.
Second, we also realize that the size of election jurisdictions and the complexity of election
administration today make the use of mechanical, optical, or electronic tabulation inevitable;
thus we see the pressing need for machine tabulation of ballots. Third, detailed studies are
needed that compare manual counts of ballots to machine tabulation to determine where er-
rors arise with each method of tabulation and how to best catch and mitigate such tabulation
errors.
We also acknowledge that we are studying this problem in a specific contest that might
limit the generalizability of our results. Granted, we have data from only Los Angeles County
which has a specific contextual framework (the unique size of this election jurisdiction, de-
mographic diversity, and the County’s unique election administration practices, procedures,
and technologies). Thus extrapolation from our specific results to other election jurisdictions
must be done with care.
Despite these caveats, we see that our analysis of this specific case highlights the need
for strong post-election auditing procedures, one of which might be a manual recounting of
some fraction of ballots cast to estimate the potential tabulation error rate. This fraction
could be set as a fixed threshold (like the current California practice of manually recounting
ballots from 1% of precincts), it could be a variable threshold (say dependent upon the
total number of ballots cast), or it could be a requirement that would be followed for only
some races (say races where a margin of 1% or less separated the top two vote getters). An
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additional question to raise is how the ballots should be sampled; should election officials
randomly sample a set threshold of precincts, or should they systematically sample from
precincts that appear to have had some type of problems? Obviously, different sampling
strategies are necessary for studying different questions, and more research is needed to
better inform these sampling decisions.
Clearly more research is necessary on how existing recount procedures help insure the
integrity of elections and whether better procedures can be developed and implemented.
There are some starts in this direction, for example a recent paper by Neff (2003) that
compares manual recount procedures to a “vote receipt” methodology, and we hope for
additional research on this important question as well as more research on recounts generally
in the near future.
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Figure 1: Histogram of All Elections
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Figure 2: Histogram of 2002 Election
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Figure 3: Histogram of Vote Margins as Percentages
